Jakarta Globe, Johannes Nugroho, Mar 10, 2015
Ahead of the 9th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in Langkawi, Malaysia next weekend, Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammudin Hussein said last month that as chair, his country would push for the formation of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. The initiative, though not new, represents a step further in Malaysia’s attitude towards greater integration for ASEAN.
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(JG
Graphics/Josep Tri Ronggo)
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Ahead of the 9th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in Langkawi, Malaysia next weekend, Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammudin Hussein said last month that as chair, his country would push for the formation of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. The initiative, though not new, represents a step further in Malaysia’s attitude towards greater integration for ASEAN.
The
peacekeeping force, if indeed established, will officially be designated for
humanitarian operations in conflict zones and natural disaster sites. However,
it will also be the first regional force through which member nations can work
together in a defense framework. If successful, it has the potential to
transform the nature of ASEAN member states’ engagement vis-à-vis China.
Malaysia’s
sponsorship of the scheme during its chairmanship is important as,
traditionally, Kuala Lumpur has preferred greater economic cooperation to
defense with its ASEAN partners. In the past, Malaysia was also opposed to any
ASEAN policy that could be interpreted as a “class action” against Chinese
interests. Its caution was perhaps in line with the views of experts on South
China Sea such as the Indonesian former top diplomat and academic Hasjim
Djalal, who argued that the formation of an “ASEAN Unity” against China could
be dangerously counterproductive.
So
Malaysia’s past strategy was to deepen trade and economic ties with Beijing,
thus increasing the stakes involved should a conflict develop. However, despite
being China’s biggest trading partner within ASEAN, Malaysia was not immune to
Beijing’s barrage of criticisms and rebukes after the MH370 incident. Clearly
for Kuala Lumpur, the strategy was no longer working.
While
abandoning lucrative trade with China would be a folly, Malaysia arguably now
looks to the multilateral framework of ASEAN with new hopes. A regional
peacekeeping force is far from being a defense pact like NATO but it will send
out an unmistakable signal to Beijing that a united ASEAN response on security
matters is plausible.
ASEAN
countries with recent experiences of Chinese intransigence, such as Vietnam and
the Philippines, will definitely welcome a more coherent ASEAN group response
and the formation of a peacekeeping force. It is the other member states that
will need to be convinced of the need of such a force.
Out of the
seven remaining members of ASEAN, Indonesia’s acquiescence in the peacekeeping
force will no doubt be crucial. As a founding member, as well as being the
largest Southeast Asian economy, Indonesia’s participation, or lack of it,
could either make or break the scheme.
Strategically,
a multilateral security blanket like an ASEAN peacekeeping force coincides with
Indonesia’s own interests. As a country prone to natural disasters, Indonesia
could expect speedy relief aid from such a force. While, as the 2004 Aceh
tsunami showed, the country can still rely upon humanitarian assistance from
friendly neighbors like India and Australia, an ASEAN disaster relief task
force in such a scenario makes more sense.
President
Joko Widodo’s doctrine of maritime fulcrum could also be put into effect in
tandem with such a regional force. Diplomatically, the country’s participation
in the force may minimize concerns over excessive nationalism in Indonesia’s
approach to border infringement. Indeed, the safety of the country’s maritime
territory could be better served by cooperating with the regional force over
issues such as illegal fishing. A general code of conduct over illegal fishing
in ASEAN waters, for example, administered with the help of the regional force,
could also keep skirmishes over the impounding of vessels between member states
to a minimum.
However,
despite the possible benefits, it remains to be seen whether Jakarta will
support the idea of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. There are at least two
indicators which may work against it.
First,
since Jokowi took office last year, his foreign policy has been inward-looking.
The current nationalist tone of Indonesia’s relations with the world may
preclude such a regionalist move.
Second,
there are signs that the current government will increase Indonesia’s economic
engagement with China. With major infrastructure projects envisaged in the last
election campaign, Beijing’s financial leverage may simply be too hard to
resist. In the event of sizeable Chinese investments pouring into Indonesia,
Jakarta may find its ability to support closer ASEAN defense ties compromised.
Malaysia’s
championing of an ASEAN peacekeeping force is a marked departure from its
previous policy on ASEAN cooperation. The strength of its determination to see
it through, however, will be tested in the forthcoming ADMM. It will be
interesting to see if Malaysia’s change of heart in its approach to ASEAN will
be enough to persuade others to follow suit.
Johannes
Nugroho is a writer from Surabaya. He can be contacted at
johannes@nonacris.com.
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