Radio Free Europe, Charles Recknagel, December 23, 2013
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| Iranian President Hassan Rohani takes questions from journalists at a news conference in New York in September. |
For years,
it seemed Iran was going deeper into isolation in its standoff with world
powers over its controversial nuclear program.
In 2013,
that suddenly changed.
In June,
Iran elected a new president who campaigned on promises to take a more moderate
approach, including in foreign policy.
And in
November, his new government cut a six-month deal with world powers to halt
some nuclear activities in exchange for some sanctions relief, a first step
toward seeking a comprehensive solution to the nuclear crisis.
But if the
two events suggest President Hassan Rohani -- a cleric and establishment
insider -- is taking Iran in a new direction after decades of confrontation
with the West, the question still remains how far things can go.
Michael Adler,
a regional scholar at the Washington-based Wilson Center, says that for now, at
least, Rohani's team is off to a strong start.
"There
definitely is a new mood, there is a new style, and we already see with the
deal that they struck in Geneva that that is something the Iranians can work
with," Adler said. "Of course, the big question is how much they are
willing to rein in their nuclear program in a comprehensive settlement and we
will see that, but there definitely is a new eagerness to negotiate, to work at
reaching a solution."
But Adler
notes that while Rohani -- a former Iranian nuclear negotiator -- has clearly
made the nuclear talks his administration's priority, he still lacks the
authority to reach a deal without the backing of Iran's supreme leader.
And that
means Rohani's momentum depends entirely upon Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has
given him a green light to bargain but is holding his own final judgment of the effort in abeyance.
"The
supreme leader has pretty much said 'go ahead' and this is what he said in 2003
when they did the suspension (of uranium enrichment)," Adler said.
"He
has pretty much said 'go ahead, try to make a deal, try to work out something
with the United States and its allies, but I am telling you that in the end
they will just try to cheat us and it won't be a good deal and you will see.'
But within that framework, they are free to go ahead and get a deal and the
supreme leader reserves for himself the right to say, 'Hey, this isn't a good
deal, they actually are trying to cheat us again, we are going to do something
else.'"
In 2003,
then nuclear negotiator Rohani reached a deal with the three key EU powers in
which Iran suspended uranium enrichment in exchange for promises of technical
aid for its nuclear-energy program. However, the deal broke down in 2005 amid
insistence from Britain, France, and Germany that Tehran also commit to
abandoning uranium enrichment, a step the supreme leader refused to take.
Now, nearly
a decade later, it remains to be seen whether Iran and the six world powers --
the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France, and Germany -- will
be able to find a lasting compromise. And the fact that any deal still depends
on Khamenei's final approval makes the effort ahead only more uncertain.
Weight Of
Sanctions
Still,
there are reasons to believe the effort set in motion by Iran's new president
has staying power.
Alex
Vatanka, an Iran expert at the Washington-based Middle East Institute, says the
negotiations offer Khamenei a solution to what has become his most pressing
concern. That is, how to assure the regime is not threatened by popular
frustration over the growing weight of U.S. and EU sanctions.
"What
we have here is Ayatollah Khamenei realizing that Iran could not stay on this
path for too much longer. When you lose $5 to $6 billion a month in oil
revenue, which represents half of your oil-export income, there is so much less
money that goes around in this country of 77 million people," Vatanka said.
"Remember,
Ayatollah Khamenei will never forget that this regime is in place because of
something that happened in 1979, which was not just a political revolution
against the monarchy, it was also an economic revolution. A lot of those people
who stood up against the shah were disenfranchised economically."
So long as
Rohani, along with his U.S.-educated Foreign Minster Mohammad Javad Zarif,
represent a way out of Iran's economic predicament, they will continue to have
Khamanei's mandate to try.
But it is a
mandate that cannot be taken for granted because it remains under constant
challenge by regime hard-liners, who prefer the highly confrontational approach
Iran took toward the West under former President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, much of
that time also with the supreme leader's backing.
All that
makes for a delicate balance in Tehran as Rohani proceeds. The new president
campaigned for more moderation both in Iran's foreign and domestic policies but
so far has had to limit his new initiatives almost exclusively to foreign
affairs -- a measure of how carefully he still must tread.
Since
taking office in August, Rohani has yet to deliver on his promises for more
social freedoms for ordinary Iranians. Some political prisoners have been
released. But the key leaders of the Green Movement that rocked Iran with
pro-democracy protests in 2009 and 2010 are still confined and political
opposition to the regime remains forbidden.
As Vatanka
said: "I don't think it is a coincidence that Rohani's first 100 days or
so have been heavy on foreign-policy change but very little change in terms of
domestic politics. In practical, tangible policies at home, we haven't seen
Rohani make any major leaps and I think he hasn't because he doesn't want to
see what happened to [former President] Mohammed Khatami between 1997 and 2005
happen to him. So, they are taking a step-by-step approach. Take the first,
most imminent issue, which is foreign policy, break the isolation, and then at
some point down the path, try to start reforming within."
Reformist
former President Khatami saw his efforts to create more freedom of the press
and expression rolled back by hard-liners who feared they could compromise the
Islamic republic's theocratic system. The theocracy is based upon the presumed
infallibility of its supreme leader, whose interpretation of religious law
prevails over the country's parliamentary democracy.
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